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ONE JUDGE’S LEGACY AND THE NEW YORK COURT OF 
APPEALS: MR. JUSTICE CARDOZO AND THE LAW OF 
CONTRACTS 
 Meredith R. Miller* 
INTRODUCTION 
Justice Benjamin Nathan Cardozo sat on the New York Court 
of Appeals from 1914 to 1932.1  During those roughly 18 years, he 
authored over 100 contract law decisions.2  By his own description and 
the description of others, Cardozo was a dedicated contextualist.  Yet, 
at least in the area of contract law, the contemporary New York Court 
of Appeals has taken a decidedly textualist approach. 
Using the backdrop of contract law, this article begins by 
contrasting the jurisprudential approach of Cardozo to that of the 
contemporary New York Court of Appeals.  It then explores how 
Cardozo might have decided a couple of notable and relatively recent 
New York Court of Appeals contract law cases.  The article draws on 
these comparisons to explore what the recent jurisprudence of the 
Court tells us about Cardozo’s legacy and the Court as an institution. 
Finally, the article concludes by questioning the doctrinal 
underpinnings of formalism – namely, the superiority of “certainty” 
and “predictability.”3  Cardozo had it right – that is to say, the drive 
for doctrinal coherence and predictability should not underestimate the 
complexity of business relations or the nature of contracting.  The best 
approach is that which most precisely aims to support the parties’ 
 
*Professor of Law, Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center, Touro College; principal, Miller Law, 
PLLC.  
1 Judith S. Kaye, Benjamin Nathan Cardozo, HISTORICAL SOCIETY OF THE COURTS                                 
OF NEW YORK, http://www.nycourts.gov/history/legal-history-new-york/luminaries-court-
appeals/cardozo-benjamin.html (last visited July 31, 2017). 
2 Arthur Corbin, Mr. Justice Cardozo and the Law of Contracts, 48 YALE L.J. 426, 426 
(1938-1939).  The title of Corbin’s article is appropriated for the title of this article.  
3 Id. at 457. 
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realistic expectations from the transaction.  It is not possible for the 
law to achieve this goal if it ignores the surrounding context of a deal. 
I. CARDOZO AS A CONTEXTUALIST 
In 1938, in Volume 48 of the Yale Law Journal, Arthur Corbin 
dedicated an entire article to the subject of Cardozo’s contract law 
jurisprudence.4  Corbin took a stroll through Cardozo’s “greatest hits,” 
often quoting liberally from the decisions.5  From that exercise, Corbin 
observed: “Cardozo’s opinions on contract law demonstrate his 
instinct for a justice that is human and practical.”6  Corbin wrote, 
“There is a clear genius in [Cardozo’s] filling of gaps, his finding of 
promises by implication where none was put into clear words, his 
discovery and enforcement of the directing purpose for which a 
contract was made, not permitting that purpose to fail by reason of 
vagueness in details.”7 
Corbin’s exposition and Cardozo’s own writings support the 
characterization of Cardozo as a “contextualist.”  Indeed, Cardozo was 
transparent about his approach to judging in The Nature of Judicial 
Process,8 the publication of a series of lectures Cardozo gave at Yale 
during his tenure on the Court of Appeals.9  In the lectures, Cardozo 
described the judicial decision making process as involving a number 
of “forces,” which include: logic, history, custom, utility and “accepted 
standards of right conduct.”10  Cardozo wrote that the weight of each 
of these forces was itself contextual: “[w]hich of these forces shall 
dominate in any case, must depend largely on comparative importance 
or value of the social interests that will be thereby promoted or 
impaired.”11   
Cardozo described the common law as “at bottom the 
philosophy of pragmatism.”12  His approach to deciding cases was a 
fluid one: “For every tendency, one seems to see a counter-tendency; 
 
4 Id. at 426.  
5 Id.  
6 Id. at 427. 
7 Corbin, supra note 2, at 427. 
8 BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (Quid Pro Books ed., 
2010) (originally published by Yale University Press, 1921). 
9  Id. at vii. 
10 Id. at 70.  
11 Id.  
12 Id. at 64. 
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for every rule its antinomy.  Nothing is stable.  Nothing absolute.  All 
is fluid and changeable.  There is an endless ‘becoming.’”13  This fluid 
approach, of course, does not give highest priority to certainty and 
predictability.  Cardozo wrote of certainty: 
I was much troubled in spirit, in my first years upon the 
bench, to find how trackless was the ocean on which I 
had embarked.  I sought for certainty.  I was oppressed 
and disheartened when I found that the quest for it was 
futile.  I was trying to reach land, the solid land of fixed 
and settled rules, the paradise of a justice that would 
declare itself by tokens plainer and more commanding 
than its pale and glimmering reflections in my own 
vacillating mind and conscience . . . . [A]nd as I have 
reflected more and more upon the nature of judicial 
process, I have become reconciled to the uncertainty, 
because I have grown to see it as inevitable.14 
Cardozo opined that certainty and, with that, the “symmetrical 
development of the law” were not the only guideposts for decision 
making and are necessarily balanced against other concerns.15  He 
wrote, “[t]he social interests served by symmetry or certainty must 
then be balanced against the social interest served by equity and 
fairness or other elements of social welfare.”16  This approach, which 
does not give highest priority to certainty and predictability, admittedly 
lacks in “precision.”17  
A contextualist approach is apparent in Cardozo’s contract law 
decisions. 
For example, in Outlet Embroidery Co. v. Derwent Mills,18 
there was an exchange of letters between two merchants concerning an 
order of goods.  The seller wrote to the buyer, in relevant part, the 
following: “Also note that the price of $3.10 per box on your Fil 
D’Angora brand which we are to ship to you is subject to change 
pending tariff revision.”19  The buyer wrote back, confirming the order 
 
13 CARDOZO, supra note 8, at 13. 
14 CARDOZO, supra note 8, at 106-07. 
15 CARDOZO, supra note 8, at 71. 
16 CARDOZO, supra note 8, at 71. 
17 CARDOZO, supra note 8, at 19. 
18 254 N.Y. 179 (1930). 
19 Id. at 182. 
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at $3.10 per box.20  The seller then refused to deliver the goods, arguing 
that the agreement was not complete because its letter stated “all prices 
subject to pending tariff.”21  Cardozo held the seller to the contract and 
refused to adhere to the literal interpretation the seller proffered.22   
Cardozo wrote that the letters were “to be read as business men 
would read them, and only as a last resort are to be thrown out 
altogether as meaningless futilities.”23  He went on to explain that the 
interpretation proffered by the seller, even if plausible on its face, could 
not possibly comport with the expectations of the parties:  
The [seller] like the [buyer] supposed that in signing 
these documents it was doing something understood to 
be significant and serious. It not only accepted the 
[buyer’s] order, but it asked the [buyer] to confirm the 
terms of the acceptance, and followed this with a cable 
of the order to its manufacturer abroad. Was it all sound 
and fury, signifying nothing?24   
Cardozo would not read the language literally because it would 
lead to “sheer absurdity,” especially given that, in June 1929, Congress 
was debating a new tariff, which was uncertain to pass and, if it did, 
could affect the prices of imports.25  Given that context, Cardozo stated 
that, while the language was not perfectly expressed, no seller and no 
buyer would read it the way the seller now suggested.26   
Another example is Cardozo’s decision in Moran v. Standard 
Oil Co.27  There, an agent expressly agreed to sell the defendant’s paint 
and painting supplies on a commission basis for five years, but there 
was no express corresponding promise by the defendant to use the 
agent for five years.28  When the defendant terminated the agent, the 
defendant argued that the agent was at will, subject to termination any 
time.29  Cardozo disagreed and implied a promise by the defendant to 




22 Id. at 185. 
23 Outlet Embroidery Co., 254 N.Y. at 183. 
24 Id.  
25 Id. at 183-84. 
26 Id. at 184. 
27 211 N.Y. 187 (1914). 
28 Id. at 195-96. 
29 Id. at 196. 
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The law, in construing the common speech of men, is 
not so nice in its judgments as the defendant’s argument 
assumes.  It does not look for precise balance of phrase, 
promise matched against promise in perfect 
equilibrium.  It does not seek such qualities even in 
written contracts, unless perhaps the most formal and 
deliberate, and least of all does it seek them where the 
words are chosen by the master under legal advice and 
accepted by the servant without the aid of like 
instruction.  There are times when reciprocal 
engagements do not fit each other like the parts of an 
indented deed, and yet the whole contract . . . may be 
‘instinct with obligation’ imperfectly expressed.30 
Cardozo used the phrase “instinct with obligation” again in his 
famous decision in Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon.31  In that case, 
to avoid a lack of consideration, Cardozo implied a return promise by 
plaintiff Otis Wood to make reasonable efforts to market Lady Duff-
Gordon’s designs.32  In that decision, Cardozo named and addressed 
formalism head on:  
It is true that [Wood] does not promise in so many 
words that he will use reasonable efforts to place the 
defendant’s indorsements and market her designs.  We 
think, however, that such a promise is fairly to be 
implied.  The law has outgrown its primitive stage of 
formalism when the precise word was the sovereign 
talisman, and every slip was fatal.  It takes a broader 
view to-day.  A promise may be lacking, and yet the 
whole writing may be ‘instinct with obligation’ 
imperfectly expressed.33 
Along similar lines, in Marks v. Cowdin,34 an employer signed 
a memo recognizing continued employment of an employee for two 
years.35  Before the two years ended, the employer terminated the 
 
30 Id. at 197-98. 
31 222 N.Y. 88, 91 (1917).  Cardozo also referenced this language and the Wood case in The 
Nature of Judicial Process.  CARDOZO, supra note 8, at 62. 
32 Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 222 N.Y. at 90-91. 
33 Id. 
34 226 N.Y. 138 (1919). 
35 Id. at 140. 
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employee.36  The agreement, which called for the provision of services 
for two years, came within the statute of frauds and was required to be 
in writing.37  The memo did not identify the employee’s position or 
describe the employee’s duties, but Cardozo held that the memo was 
nevertheless sufficient to satisfy the statute of frauds because one must 
look beyond the language on the face of the memo itself: 
In thus identifying the position we are not importing 
into the contract a new element of promise.  We are 
turning signs and symbols into their equivalent 
realities.  This must always be done to some extent, no 
matter how many are the identifying tokens. ‘In every 
case, the words must be translated into things and facts 
by parol evidence.’  How far that process may be 
extended is a question of degree. We exclude the 
writing that refers us to spoken words of promise.  We 
admit the one that bids us ascertain a place or a relation 
by comparison of the description with some ‘manifest, 
external, and continuing fact.’  The statute must not be 
pressed to the extreme of a literal and rigid logic.  Some 
compromise is inevitable if words are to fulfill their 
function as symbols of things and of ideas.  How many 
identifying tokens we are to exact, the reason and 
common sense of the situation may tell us.38 
Cardozo instructs that the contract is to be interpreted in light of what 
reason and common sense suggest in the given situation, not by literal 
adherence to the language on the face of a document.39 
II. THE FORMALISM OF THE CONTEMPORARY NEW YORK 
COURT OF APPEALS 
By contrast, the modern institution of New York courts, and 
especially its highest court, adheres to formalism.  Professor Geoffrey 
P. Miller has hypothesized that the formalism of New York courts 
explains why it is common for major business transactions to contain 
 
36 Id. at 141-42. 
37 Id. at 142. 
38 Id. at 143-44 (citations omitted). 
39 Marks, 226 N.Y. at 144-45.  
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choice of law clauses that opt for New York law.40  Professor Miller 
compared many facets of contract doctrine in New York and 
California–from formation to interpretation–and determined that, in 
most areas of the doctrine, New York adheres to formalism.41  
Professor Miller opined that this formalism, which leads to certainty 
and predictability, explained why businesses opt for New York law.42  
Miller found: “New York judges are formalists. Especially in 
commercial cases, they have little tolerance for attempts to re-write 
contracts to make them fairer or more equitable, and they look to the 
written agreement as the definitive source of interpretation.”43   
He continued:  
Both New York and California recognize freedom of 
contract as fundamental, although limited at times by 
other values; however New York gives comparatively 
more weight to contractual freedom.  In the absence of 
severe inequality of bargaining power, New York 
courts almost never upset private arrangements, no 
matter how inequitable they may appear ex post.  New 
York’s tenderness for freedom of contract expresses 
itself, at times, in a seemingly atavistic pleasure in 
imposing the consequences of bad bargains.44   
On this point, Miller cited Oppenheimer & Co. v. Oppenheim, 
Appel, Dixon & Co.,45 a 1995 New York Court of Appeals decision, 
which, at least for “sophisticated parties,”46 unambiguously expressed 
an adherence to formalism: 
Freedom of contract prevails in an arm’s length 
transaction between sophisticated parties such as these, 
and in the absence of countervailing public policy 
concerns there is no reason to relieve them of the 
consequences of their bargain.  If they are dissatisfied 
 
40 Geoffrey P. Miller, Bargains Bicoastal: New Light on Contract Theory, 31 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 1475, 1477 (2010) [hereinafter BARGAINS BICOASTAL]. 
41 Id. at 1478-80. 
42 Id. at 1522. 
43 Id. at 1478. 
44 Id. at 1479. 
45 86 N.Y.2d 685 (1995). 
46 Id. at 695.  
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with the consequences of their agreement, ‘the time to 
say so [was] at the bargaining table.’47 
III. WHAT WOULD CARDOZO DO? 
If Cardozo was on the New York Court of Appeals today it is 
uncertain whether he would influence its approach to decision making 
or simply wind up a frequent dissenting voice. 
A. Conditions & Substantial Performance 
Take for example Oppenheimer & Co. v. Oppenheim, Appel, 
Dixon & Co., quoted above.  In that case, plaintiff (a national, full-
service investment firm) had three years remaining on a lease of the 
33rd floor of One New York Plaza in Manhattan.48  Defendant (an 
accounting firm) was already a tenant on the 29th floor of the same 
building.49  Plaintiff was looking to vacate the premises and sublease 
the space on the 33rd floor.  Plaintiff and defendant entered into a letter 
agreement setting forth certain conditions precedent to the formation 
of a sublease between them.50   
Defendant wanted to construct a telephone linkage system 
between the 29th and 33rd floors.51  Thus, one express condition 
precedent to formation of the sublease was that plaintiff provide 
defendant with the prime landlord’s consent in writing on or before a 
date certain.52  On that date certain, plaintiff’s attorney called 
defendant’s attorney to say that the prime landlord had consented to 
the work.53  When defendant later refused to go forward with the 
sublease, plaintiff sued for breach of contract.54   
Defendant moved to dismiss the complaint in its entirety, 
claiming that the sublease was never formed because plaintiff failed to 
comply with the express condition precedent that plaintiff provide 
defendant with written notice of the prime landlord’s consent.55  
 
47 Id.  
48 Id. at 687.  
49 Id. at 688.  
50 Oppenheimer & Co., 86 N.Y.2d at 688.  
51 Id. 
52 Id.  
53 Id.  
54 Id. at 689.  
55 Oppenheimer & Co., 86 N.Y.2d at 687-90.  
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Plaintiff argued that its attorney notified defendant orally and, 
therefore, substantially complied with the condition.56  The New York 
Court of Appeals held for defendant on the ground that the express 
condition precedent required written notice and, therefore, it had not 
been satisfied.57 
It is black letter law that an express condition requires strict 
compliance.58  The reasoning is that the court should not frustrate the 
clearly expressed intention of the parties.59  In Oppenheimer, the oral 
notice of the prime landlord’s consent did not satisfy the strict 
requirement of written notice.60  For sure, the result seems harsh and 
overly technical.  The parties’ attorneys had a discussion, and through 
that discussion, defendant was on actual notice of the prime landlord’s 
consent to the work.61  Certainly, plaintiff had complied with the spirit 
of the condition.  
Notably absent from the decision was any discussion of what 
Cardozo likely would have paid the most attention to: the parties’ 
intent in requiring written notice.  One can certainly imagine that 
defendant wanted tangible evidence of the prime landlord’s consent 
before taking on any obligations.  On the other hand, another very 
plausible view of the case is that defendant was not so concerned about 
having the notice in writing but was able to use the written notice 
condition as a pretext, as a way to walk away from the sublease based 
on a technicality.  The Court appeared to recognize the technical nature 
of the decision (some might describe it as “gotcha formalism”).  
Absent more context concerning the condition, despite the fact that he 
is quoted and his name is invoked, it is hard to imagine that Cardozo 
would have joined with the majority. 
The parties in Oppenheimer each relied on the 1921 Cardozo 
decision in Jacob & Youngs v. Kent62 to support their positions.  In 
Jacob & Youngs, a builder contracted to build a summer residence and 
the written contract called for use of Reading pipe.63  For most of the 
house, the builder used Cohoes pipe instead.64  Cohoes pipe was 
 
56 Id. at 692.  
57 Id. at 690-91. 
58 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 224 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).  
59 Oppenheimer & Co., 86 N.Y.2d at 695.  
60 Id. at 687. 
61 Id. at 688-89.  
62 230 N.Y. 239 (1921). 
63 Id. at 240.  
64 Id. at 246.  
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inferred to be no different in quality or grade than Reading pipe.65  
Nevertheless, the client refused to pay the builder because the contract 
specified Reading pipe.66  Notably, the only way to change out the 
pipes was to tear down the entire structure and rebuild.67  
Writing for the dissent, Judge Chester B. McLaughlin would 
have held that the client should get exactly what he contracted for – 
Reading pipe: 
The defendant had a right to contract for what he 
wanted.  He had a right before making payment to get 
what the contract called for. . . . What his reason was 
for requiring this kind of pipe is of no importance.  He 
wanted that and was entitled to it.68   
There is some appeal in McLaughlin’s simply applied rule that adheres 
to the letter of the contract.  But Cardozo, writing for majority, took a 
different approach.   
Cardozo held that, even though the builder did not use the 
specified pipe, this entitles the client to damages – namely the 
difference in objective value between what he was promised and what 
he received (there, zero).69  The failure, which was not substantial, did 
not excuse the client from paying the builder.70  Cardozo explained: 
Considerations partly of justice and partly of 
presumable intention are to tell us whether this or that 
promise shall be placed in one class or in another. The 
simple and the uniform will call for different remedies 
from the multifarious and the intricate. The margin of 
departure within the range of normal expectation upon 
a sale of common chattels will vary from the margin to 
be expected upon a contract for the construction of a 
mansion or a ‘skyscraper.’ There will be harshness 
sometimes and oppression in the implication of a 
condition when the thing upon which labor has been 
expended is incapable of surrender because united to 
the land, and equity and reason in the implication of a 
 
65 Id. at 241.  
66 Id. at 246.  
67 Jacob & Youngs, 230 N.Y. at 240-41. 
68 Id. at 247 (McLaughlin, J., dissenting). 
69 Id. at 244. 
70 Id. at 245.  
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like condition when the subject-matter, if defective, is 
in shape to be returned. From the conclusion that 
promises may not be treated as dependent to the extent 
of their uttermost minutiae without a sacrifice of 
justice, the progress is a short one to the conclusion that 
they may not be so treated without a perversion of 
intention. Intention not otherwise revealed may be 
presumed to hold in contemplation the reasonable and 
probable. If something else is in view, it must not be 
left to implication. There will be no assumption of a 
purpose to visit venial faults with oppressive 
retribution.71   
He continued: 
Those who think more of symmetry and logic in the 
development of legal rules than of practical adaptation 
to the attainment of a just result will be troubled by a 
classification where the lines of division are so 
wavering and blurred. Something, doubtless, may be 
said on the score of consistency and certainty in favor 
of a stricter standard. The courts have balanced such 
considerations against those of equity and fairness, and 
found the latter to be the weightier. The decisions in this 
state commit us to the liberal view, which is making its 
way, nowadays, in jurisdictions slow to welcome it.72 
In Oppenheimer, both sides discussed the Jacob & Youngs 
decision extensively in briefing to the Court.73  Plaintiff argued that the 
written notice was just like the pipes in Jacob & Youngs – plaintiff told 
the defendant orally that the work had been approved.74  Even though 
the notice was not in writing, the plaintiff had substantially complied 
and the intention of including that provision had been fulfilled.75  
 
71 Id. at 242. 
72 Jacob & Youngs, 230 N.Y. at 242-43. 
73 See Brief of Defendant-Appellant, Oppenheimer & Co. v. Oppenheim, Appel, Dixon & 
Co., 86 N.Y.2d 685 (1995) (No. 13916/87), 1995 WL 17050831 (N.Y.), at *9; Brief of 
Plaintiff-Respondent, Oppenheimer & Co. v. Oppenheim, Appel, Dixon & Co., 86 N.Y.2d 685 
(1995) (No. 13916/87), 1995 WL 17050834 (N.Y.), at *4, 27, 30, 35, 38, 40, 47; Reply Brief 
of Defendant-Appellant, Oppenheimer & Co. v. Oppenheim, Appel, Dixon & Co., 86 N.Y.2d 
685 (1995) (No. 13916/87), 1995 WL 17050837 (N.Y.), at *5-6. 
74 Brief of Plaintiff-Respondent, supra note 73, at *39-41.   
75 Brief of Plaintiff-Respondent, supra note 73, at *36.   
11
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Defendant also pointed to Jacob & Youngs by distinguishing it.76  
Defendant argued that, unlike Jacob & Youngs, the agreement, by 
using the word “unless,” had used language of express condition, 
requiring strict adherence.77  Defendant successfully argued that, 
unlike Jacob & Youngs, the express condition required more than 
substantial compliance.78  In siding with defendant’s literal 
interpretation, the Court held that the express condition did not permit 
for substantial performance but, rather, required strict compliance with 
the requirement of written notice.79 The Court looked to Cardozo’s 
language in Jacob & Youngs: 
But Judge Cardozo was careful to note that the situation 
would be different in the case of an express condition: 
“This is not to say that the parties are not free 
by apt and certain words to effectuate a purpose 
that performance of every term shall be a 
condition of recovery. That question is not here. 
This is merely to say that the law will be slow 
to impute the purpose, in the silence of the 
parties, where the significance of the default is 
grievously out of proportion to the oppression 
of the forfeiture.”80 
Certainly, this was what Cardozo had written in Jacob & Youngs.  But 
it is difficult to concede that he would have reached the same result in 
Oppenheimer.  Cardozo would have wanted to know more: what was 
the purpose of requiring a writing?  What was customary in these types 
of subleases?  In the words of his decision in Outlet Embroidery, was 
the Court reading the words of the agreement “as business men would 
read them”?81 
 
76 Brief of Defendant-Appellant, supra note 73, at *9-10.   
77 Reply Brief of Defendant-Appellant, supra note 73, at *8.    
78 Reply Brief of Defendant-Appellant, supra note 73, at *3-4.  
79 Oppenheimer & Co., 86 N.Y.2d at 694.  
80 Id. (quoting Jacob & Youngs, 230 N.Y. at 243-44).   
81 Outlet Embroidery Co., 254 N.Y. at 183. 
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B. Vagueness and Indefiniteness 
Cardozo was not afraid of vagueness or indefiniteness.  This 
placed him in the dissent in Varney v. Ditmars.82  There, an employer 
was paying $35 per week and when the employee was offered another 
job that would pay more, the employer told the employee to stay with 
the company and the employee would receive $40 per week plus, at 
the end of the year, a “fair share of [] profits.”83  When the employer 
did not follow through on the promise, the issue was whether the 
promise to pay a “fair share” was too vague, indefinite and uncertain 
to enforce.84  Judge Emory Chase, writing for the majority of the court, 
held that the promise was too indefinite to bind the employer:  
The statement alleged to have been made by the 
defendant about giving the plaintiff and said designer a 
fair share of his profits is vague, indefinite and 
uncertain and the amount cannot be computed from 
anything that was said by the parties or by reference to 
any document, paper or other transaction. The minds of 
the parties never met upon any particular share of the 
defendant’s profits to be given the employees or upon 
any plan by which such share could be computed or 
determined. The contract so far as it related to the 
special promise or inducement was never 
consummated.85 
Cardozo dissented, on the firmly held belief that, if presented with 
relevant evidence, the Court could figure out what was “fair” and there 
was, thus, a promise that could be enforced.86  Cardozo wrote: 
I do not think it is true that a promise to pay an 
employee a fair share of the profits in addition to his 
salary is always and of necessity too vague to be 
enforced.  The promise must, of course, appear to have 
been made with contractual intent. But if that intent is 
present, it cannot be said from the mere form of the 
promise that the estimate of the reward is inherently 
 
82 217 N.Y. 223 (1916). 
83 Id. at 225, 226. 
84 Id. at 227. 
85 Id. 
86 Id. at 233 (Cardozo, J., dissenting).  
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impossible. The data essential to measurement may be 
lacking in the particular instance, and yet they may 
conceivably be supplied.87 
Approximately fifty years after Cardozo left the New York 
Court of Appeals, in Joseph Martin, Jr. Delicatessen v. Schumacher,88 
the Court maintained this approach to indefiniteness when it took a 
decidedly formalist approach to “agreements to agree.”89  Agreements 
to agree are a classic contract law problem for courts because, absent 
an ability of the parties to reach an agreement, without clear 
instruction, the manner enforcing the promise to agree is indefinite.90  
The case involved a renewal clause in the lease of a space operated as 
a deli.91 The renewal clause was described by the Court as “unadorned” 
because it did not set a renewal rent or provide a method for calculating 
the renewal rent.92  Instead, it only provided that the renewal rent was 
“to be agreed.”93  Judge Jacob D. Fuchsberg held that the renewal 
clause could not be enforced: “[A] mere agreement to agree, in which 
a material term is left for future negotiations, is unenforceable.”94 
Dissenting in part, Judge Michael J. Jasen channeled Cardozo 
and would have set the rent by implying a reasonable rent term, 
pointing to the Appellate Division decision written by Judge Leon 
Lazer that the Court was reversing.95  Judge Lazer had held that 
 
87 Varney, 217 N.Y. at 233. Another example of Cardozo’s fluidity and openness to 
uncertainty arises in Beatty v. Guggenheim Exploration Co., 225 N.Y. 380, 387-88 (1919).  
There, Cardozo held that a clause prohibiting oral modification of the contract was 
unenforceable because the clause itself is subject to amendment or waiver.  He wrote:  
Those who make a contract may unmake it.  The clause which forbids a 
change, may be changed like any other.  The prohibition of an oral waiver, 
may itself be waived. . . . What is excluded by one act, is restored by 
another.  You may put it out by the door; it is back through the window.  
Whenever two men contract, no limitation self-imposed can destroy their 
power to contract again. 
Later, a New York statute was enacted to extinguish “the Beatty rule” and allow enforcement 
of “no oral modification clauses.” N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 15-301 (McKinney 2018). In 
Israel v. Chabra, 12 N.Y.3d 158 (2009), the New York Court of Appeals reinforced the statute 
and the nullity of the Beatty rule.  
88 52 N.Y.2d 105 (1981). 
89 Id. at 110.  
90 Id.  
91 Id. at 108. 
92 Id. at 110-11.  
93 Joseph Martin, Jr. Delicatessen, 52 N.Y.2d at 111. 
94 Id. at 109. 
95 Id. at 112 (Jasen, J., dissenting). 
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enforcement of the renewal clause better effectuates the intent of the 
parties than striking the clause altogether.96  He further held that a 
“renewal option has a more sympathetic claim to enforcement than [] 
most vague [] terms” because valuable consideration will often have 
already been paid for the option.97  This position is classic Cardozo: an 
interpretation that looks to context better effectuates the intent of the 
parties than a literal adherence to the words (or lack of words) of the 
written agreement. 
IV.  WHAT DOES THE FORMALISM OF THE NEW YORK COURT 
OF APPEALS TELL US ABOUT THE LEGACY OF JUDGE 
CARDOZO OR THE COURT AS AN INSTITUTION? 
Judge Cardozo was not making new laws or changing contract 
doctrine per se.  He had a philosophy about judging that looked beyond 
the literal – especially to avoid absurd results.  Given that he is the 
most revered and recognized judge to ever serve on the New York 
Court of Appeals, one might think that his judicial philosophy would 
be his legacy and would leave a mark on how the institution decides 
cases.  That said, there is an insight that can be drawn from the 
divergent approaches of Cardozo and the modern court generally as an 
institution, but it is not a new one.  The insight was already articulated 
in Professor Andrew Kaufman’s biography of Cardozo and more 
specifically in Professor Kaufman’s foreword to The Nature of 
Judicial Process.98  There, Professor Kaufman wrote: 
A common complaint, offered by judges, is that 
Cardozo’s prescription does not help a judge to decide 
a particular case.  Of course not.  Indeed, in a way, a 
subtheme of Cardozo’s lectures is that judicial 
decision-making involves a nuanced approach among 
different considerations, any one of which may be 
dominant with respect to a particular issue or in the 
context of particular facts.  He was essentially an 
accommodationist, but the totality of the messages was 
ambiguous.  That ambiguity, I think, has contributed to 
his enduring reputation.  How one applies Cardozo to 
 
96 Joseph Martin, Jr., Delicatessen, Inc. v. Schumacher, 419 N.Y.S.2d 558, 560 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 1979), rev’d, 52 N.Y.2d 105 (1981). 
97 Id. 
98 CARDOZO, supra note 8. 
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different situations depends on what strand of thought 
is emphasized in different contexts.  Even judges who 
subscribe fully to his message will put the elements of 
decision-making together in different ways in 
particular cases, each side citing different Cardozo 
words for support.99 
Indeed, part of Cardozo’s enduring legacy is exactly that: because he 
took a contextual approach to deciding cases, his decisions are often 
used by both sides of the same case to support their position.  This is 
true in Oppenheimer, where, as discussed, both sides invoked 
Cardozo’s decision in Jacob & Youngs to the extent that it served their 
arguments.100  There is a beauty in Cardozo’s rejection of simplicity 
and certainty.  In the complexities that contextualism embraces, his 
decisions will be invoked in varying ways, often in competing sides of 
the same case.  
V.  CONCLUSION: IS “CERTAINTY” AND “PREDICTABILITY”  
REALLY BETTER FOR BUSINESS? 
The unexpected place this research leads is to question the 
apparent assumption of formalism in contract doctrine – that certainty 
and predictability in contract doctrine is better for business.101  This, it 
seems, is an oversimplification of business relationships and the nature 
of contracting.   
In Regulating Contracts, Professor Hugh Collins has written 
about “contractual behaviour” as existing in three dimensions: the 
business relation, the economic deal and the contract.102  The business 
relation is in part social, or what might be described as relational, and 
“precedes the transaction and is expected to persist after 
performance.”103  Professor Collins explains “[i]t consists of the 
trading relation between the parties, made up by numerous 
interactions, some of which may involve contracts, but often will 
 
99 CARDOZO, supra note 8, at x-xi (emphasis added). 
100 Compare Brief of Plaintiff-Respondent, supra note 73, with Reply Brief of Defendant-
Appellant, supra note 73.   
101 Indeed, Professor Miller identified this premise as a reason that choice of law clauses in 
major transactions commonly opted for New York law. BARGAINS BICOASTAL, supra note 40, 
at 1522. 
102 HUGH COLLINS, REGULATING CONTRACTS 128 (Oxford Univ. Press 1999). 
103 Id. at 129.  
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consist of enquiries, discussions of plans, and sorting out problems 
which have arisen.”104  The economic deal is the agreement between 
the parties – the economics of the obligations exchanged.105  The 
contract is the standards of self-regulation set by the parties or, more 
commonly, their attorneys.106   
A formalist approach to determining the parties’ obligations 
most intently (if not exclusively) focuses on this third dimension – the 
literal form of the written document.  But, once these three dimensions 
are acknowledged, supporting the parties’ intentions becomes 
complicated.  Cardozo recognized this complexity and the elusive 
nature of certainty.  His approach, which valued context, left open the 
exploration of all three dimensions in interpreting whether and to what 
extent the parties had obligated themselves. 
Brilliantly, Professor Collins explains that there can be a 
“tension between the objective of supporting the expectation of the 
parties and the distracting planning documents” and he posits that “the 
kind of legal regulation of contract which best suits the interests of 
business is one which supports the expectation of business in entering 
transactions.”107  This approach to contracts would “give priority to the 
business relation, with secondary attention to the business deal, and 
relegate the contract to a peripheral role.”108  Professor Collins 
recognizes that this view is controversial because of the “paramount 
importance” that lawyers attach to “the value of certainty.”109  
Professor Collins writes: 
My contention is that the type of law that best 
contributes to the construction of markets and a vibrant 
economy would be one that avoids clear-cut 
entitlements based upon the contractual framework in 
favour of a more contextual examination of business 
expectations based upon the business relation and the 
business deal.  In order to achieve this style of legal 
reasoning, it is necessary to reduce its formalism, and 
to point the courts towards an investigation of the 
 
104 Id.  
105 Id. at 129-31. 
106 Id. at 131-32. 
107 COLLINS, supra note 102, at 175. 
108 COLLINS, supra note 102, at 175. 
109 COLLINS, supra note 102, at 175. 
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relations and expectations in which the contract is 
embedded.110  
Cardozo understood this intuitively.   
 
 
110 COLLINS, supra note 102, at 176. 
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